T is the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas that the just man enjoys a quasi-experimental knowledge of the divine Persons inhabiting his soul.
quasi-experimental knowledge of the inhabiting Persons. But his interpretation of experimental knowledge is a little different from Gardeil's.
First of all, one thing is certain, he says, and beyond dispute: this knowledge is not discursive, does not include an inference; that is to say, the just man does not conclude to the presence of God from an effect in the soul. But at the same time the quasi experience is not immediate knowledge, for the only truly immediate knowledge of God is vision: there is no such thing as immediate experimental knowledge which is obscure. The only immediate experience of God possible to the just man in this life is an affective one, an experience which is not in the intellect but in the will.
But if experimental knowledge is not discursive and not immediate, what is it? Can some intermediate knowledge be distinguished? Gardeil apparently did not think so, because for him all experimental knowledge is immediate knowledge. But Garrigou-Lagrange postulates a third kind of knowledge, which is neither discursive not immediate: it is knowledge of God through the effects of filial affection which He produces in us. Such is quasi-experimental knowledge, mediate knowledge which is "supradiscursive." The medium, the effects of filial love, is not only that which is known but also that by which God is known. In a word, therefore, while Gardeil "tient pourtant... que l'effet d'amour filial produit en nous par Dieu est id quo experitur, non ut quod cognoscitur" Garrigou-Lagrange insists: "Il nous semble certain au contraire que cet effet est à la fois ce que est immédiatement expérimenté et ce par quoi nous connaissons quasi experimentaliter et sans raisonnement la présence vivifiante de Dieu." 11 Accordingly, the just man (1) immediately experiences the effect of filial love which God has produced in his soul, and (2) by this effect, without reasoning, cognizes the presence of God quasi-experimentally.
But why, then, does St. Thomas refer to this knowledge as quasiexperimental? He does so for two reasons. The first is that in this Ufe we do not, properly speaking, experience God immediately, but only through the effects of filial love which He produces in us. The second is that the just man cannot differentiate with absolute certainty 361 between the supernatural effect of filial love and a certain natural, sentimental lifting up of the heart which resembles it.
Finally, in the theory of Garrigou-Lagrange, the quasi-experimental knowledge pertains to infused contemplation. At first it is only habitual: the divine Persons sent to the just soul are, in the very production of the gifts of grace, experimentally knowable; and this is all that is required for the invisible mission. But thanks to a special inspiration of the gift of wisdom by the Holy Spirit, this habitual cognition becomes actual experimental knowledge; and this, according to Garrigou-Lagrange, is but the normal development of the gifts of sanctifying grace.
Accordingly, Garrigou-Lagrange interprets St. Thomas' cognitio experimentalis as neither discursive knowledge nor immediate perception but as "supradiscursive" and mediate in the effect of filial love.
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Theory of Paul Galtier, S.J.: Discursive Knowledge
Paul Galtier, in a polemic work against Gardeil, 13 argues for an ontological theory of the inhabitation, explaining the special presence by efficient and exemplary causality. He accuses his adversaries of faulty method, namely, of taking formulas of St. Thomas out of their historical setting and tradition. Thus, we should not be too quick, he cautions, to interpret quasi experimentalis cognitio from the strict sense of the word alone.
14 For St. Thomas attaches to it a meaning far different from a direct and immediate perception of the divine Persons: for him, experimental knowledge is not direct cognition of God Himself, but indirect, in the effects in which He manifests Himself. From certain signs perceived in the soul, such as delight in God, peace of conscience, and so forth, a just man can conjecture that he possesses the gifts of grace; he cannot know this for certain, because 362 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES he cannot know for certain that his acts proceed from a supernatural principle; for the acts of charity and of the gifts are not perceptibly different from the acts of natural love and the simple moral virtues, nor are they accompanied by such sweetness as to be otherwise in explicable. These gifts of grace then lead, in turn, to a knowledge of the divine Persons inhabiting the soul, achieved in virtue of a double inference: first, from the experimental signs in the soul to the gifts of grace, and then from these gifts to the divine Persons in whose image they are modeled. 16 Thus, for Galtier, quasi experimentalis cognitio means indirect knowledge of the divine Persons achieved by discursive reasoning. It is probable knowledge, habitual or virtual 16 in the gifts of grace; but with few exceptions, such as baptized infants and the insane, it can be readily actualized in every just man.
17
Hence we see that modern theologians are not in agreement on the meaning of quasi-experimental knowledge of the divine Persons dwelling in the just man's soul. According to Galtier, St. Thomas was thinking of discursive knowledge of the divine Persons had by con jecturing from certain savorous effects experienced in the soul to the divine presence as the probable cause; and while this knowledge does not have to be actual in order that there be an invisible mission, but need only be habitual in the possession of the habits of sanctifying grace, nevertheless it does become actual, as a matter of fact, in most just men. According to Gardeil and Garrigou-Lagrange, on the other hand, St. Thomas meant neither discursive knowledge nor, of course, intuitive vision, but rather imperfect, obscure, uncertain cognition. For Gardeil, it is immediate knowledge of the divine Persons without any objective medium or species, supraintentional knowledge; thus, the effects of God's presence in the just soul are quo experitur but not quod cognoscitur. For Garrigou-Lagrange, however, it is mediate knowledge of the divine Persons in the effect of filial love which God produces in the just soul; this effect of filial love is both quod and quo cognoscitur.
Garden, Garrigou-Lagrange, Galtìer, and their adherents have arrived at their explanations of quasi-experimental knowledge by speculating on the meaning of the expression as it appears in St. Thomas' writings. But they have not studied the expression, as Galtier recommends, in its historical setting and tradition. But this is what is imperative. For, unless the contrary be demonstrated, the presumption is that St. Thomas used the term experimentalis cognitio with the meaning that was commonly attached to it by his immediate predecessors and contemporaries.
EXPERIMENT ALIS COGNITI O BETWEEN USO AND 1255
Muti est percipi
Peter Lombard (d. 1160) in the fifteenth distinction of the first volume of his celebrated Sententiarum libri quatuor (1150-52) explains that the Son of God is said to be "sent" not only "cum visibiliter mundo apparuit carne indutus" but also "cum se in animas pias sic transfert, ut ab eis percipiatur ac cognoscatur. Parisiensis (ca. 1253-56) . 38 In an attempt to explain this same Augustinian text, "Et tunc unicuique mittitur cum a quodam cognoscitur atque percipitur," St. Albert the Great opens his discussion in his Commentary on the Sentences (1243-49) with basically the same difficulty: the divine Persons are sent to souls enriched with grace, not knowledge. In his solution he describes in detail the kind of knowledge that goes with a mission : 
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Rufus of Cornwall, who repeats it verbatim in his Commentarius
39
Therefore, for Albert, the just man's cognition is necessary for the mission, but only a certain kind. To be specific, it has three elements. We should consider his present explanation of the first element in conjunction with an explanation he gave in the preceding distinction : Accordingly, this knowledge is on the part of the object known {ex parte cogniti): the divine Person must be objectively knowable in a gift as in a sign. This sign must be an effect of gratia gratum faciens, 369 and it must be able to be appropriated to the Son or the Holy Spirit. In distinction 14 Albert explains why the gift must pertain to gratia gratumfaciens: in order that there be a temporal procession, the divine Person must be shown to be present in a new way with the created effect, but only the gifts of gratia gratum faciens entail a special communication of the divine Persons to our souls. Furthermore, the effect must be appropriable to the personal properties of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; for the gift does not manifest simply the presence of God in the just soul but the presence of the very Person who is sent. Therefore, the first and fundamental element in our knowledge of the mission is an objective cognoscibility or manifestation 40 of the divine Person in a gift of grace acting as a sign.
41
The second element in the just man's knowledge of the divine Persons is habitual cognition: Secunda est habitualis cognitio. St. Albert seems to take habitualis cognitio here as denoting the habits of grace not merely inasmuch as they objectively manifest the divine Persons but inasmuch as they are subjective virtues enabling the just man to know these Persons. For since Albert seems to indicate that only the first cognition refers to an objective manifestation (una.. .est ex parte cogniti), one may assume, so it would seem, that the second, habitualis cognitio, is ex parte cognoscentis.
The third element in the just man's threefold knowledge of the mission is conjectural knowledge (conjecturalis ex signis). The just man observes certain facts: he finds himself detached from vain loves, joys, hopes, and so forth, and thence conjectures to the presence of the divine Persons in his soul. This conjecture, of course, falls short of certain, scientific knowledge. 42 However, Albert points out, strictly speaking, no actual knowledge is necessary. Here he is thinking, it would seem, of the case of baptized infants who have the divine Persons sent to dwell in their souls and yet have no actual knowledge of Them. 
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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES cum a quodam cognoscitur atque percipitur. ,, We have witnessed the solutions to this problem offered by the predecessors of St. Thomas. It remains for us to see that Thomas' solution, formulated in terms of experimental knowledge, does not represent a break with this theological tradition but rather takes its harmonious place in it. But first we must pause briefly to learn what precisely experimentalis cognitio meant, and how it was used, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
Experimentalis cognitio
The notion of experimental knowledge was introduced by medieval writers, it would seem, in an effort to solve the controverted question, whether a just man is able to know that he possesses divine charity. As early as 1206-9, Prevostin had argued that the just man can know that he has charity through an experimentum." William of Auxerre expanded on this, explaining that the just man can know that he has charity through scientia experimenti que est per signa: these signs are the possession of a joy of spirit, the conception of noble desires, and the performance of good works. 45 Hugh of St. Cher, too, in his enormous commentary on Sacred Scripture says that just men can know the charity in their souls with scientia experientiae sive conjectural* or cognitio experientiae quae est per conjecturas.
47 Such knowledge is acquired by conjecturing from various signs, such as joy in the good fortune of others and sorrow at their misfortune, selflessness, remorse for sin, ease in God's service, and so forth.
48
Roland of Cremona, in the long discussion of the question of the cognoscibility of charity which appears in his Summa (ca. 1233), does not use the term "experience," but he does explain lucidly and unequivocally the nature of the just man's knowledge of his charity: he can taste the sweet effects of charity in his affectus and from these as well as from other signs he reasons syllogistically to the probable presence of charity in his soul.
49
But it is only among the Franciscans, particularly in the searching questions of John of La Rochelle, that one finds a thoroughgoing and lucid explanation of the nature and meaning of experimental knowledge. John's master, Alexander of Hales, had preserved the traditional teaching of the doctors before him. In his Commentary on the Sentences he repeats that charity can be experienced by a fallible experiment {experiri... experimento fallibili), since the sweetness of love can be sensed in our works; 60 moreover, he notes, our knowledge of our charity is joined to feeling {est cum affectu).
61 However, it is not Alexander but his disciple, John of La Rochelle, who gathers together these ideas and gives us in three extensive and penetrating articles 62 a precise and scientific definition of experimental knowledge. First of all, experimental knowledge {scientia experimentalis) is sharply distinguished from speculative knowledge {scientia speculativa), which is certain, scientific knowledge acquired through an infallible medium like the cause or certain effect. Experimental knowledge, on the other hand, is defined as cognition acquired through a fallible medium, that is to say, through fallible signs which constitute for the just man an experimentum failax. Thus, he points out, if a man experiences a certain peace and gladness in his soul, which are effects of grace, he can conclude, but not with certitude, that this peace and joy are indeed effects of grace. Moreover, experimental knowledge is also described by John of La Rochelle as affective knowledge {scientia afectiva), since it derives from an affective experience of love or delight or taste: ".. The distinction drawn by John of La Rochelle between speculative and affective or experimental knowledge finds its way into the anonymous commentary of Codex Vaticanus latinus 691; but here the affective knowledge is called practical (practica) rather than affective or experimental. The terminology here is borrowed from Alexander 64 but the sense is the same as in John of La Rochelle; for practical knowledge is affective knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is joined to love: "habet amorem secum annexum."
55 Similarly, the redactor of the Summa fratris Alexandria in addition to incorporating the questions of John of La Rochelle into his work, 56 also employs this distinction in another place: a man who believes revealed truths with faith informed by charity, the author tells us, does so not merely with the kind of certitude that comes from intellectual speculation {certitudo speculationis intellectus) but with the kind that is rooted in an affective experience {certitudo experientiae ex parte ajfectus).* 7 Finally, in this connection, St. Bonaventure merely repeats that the just man can have cognitio experientiae of his charity and that he has this per conjecturas, that is, from fallible signs such as the mortification of his concupiscences and his vain and worldly affections, a lack of remorse, and so on.
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The notion of experimental knowledge was also put to use by medieval theologians in their discussions of the gift of wisdom. The reason for this is easy to understand, since wisdom was conceived of not as sheer knowledge but as knowledge that is coupled with love and taste. That wisdom is more than mere cognition of God was pointed out by Peter Lombard, who observed that it included love and delectation, 69 and by Peter of Poitiers, who recognized that wisdom, etymologically speaking, derives its name from the word for By taste (sapor) is meant the affections of the soul or, in an objective sense, those qualities of an object from which affections arise. 84 In other words, a man knows God's goodness; this knowledge stimulates the affectus to love and delectation, that is, to taste. Such knowledge, therefore, is sápida, savorous, inasmuch as it generates saporem ajfectionis or inasmuch as it proceeds from a consideration of those qualities of an object which give rise to affective movements in the soul.
86 Hugh of St. Cher, too, was clear on this point: wisdom gives a taste of God, and this taste is an act of the affective part of the soul.
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We have already seen above 67 how this tradition was preserved among the Franciscans, who also described the created wisdom that accompanies a divine mission as cognitio cum sapore. In line with this tradition St. Bonaventure explained that wisdom is affective or loving knowledge, that is to say, knowledge (lumen cognitionis) that is coupled with the affection of spiritual taste (sapor ajfectionis).* 1 Hence it is that wisdom, whose principal act is the affective act of sapor, is knowledge which is experiential of goodness and sweetness (experimentalis boni et dulcís The same doctrine, it may be noted, was received by St. Albert: cognitio experimentalis is had thanks to the affective powers of spiritual taste and feeling. 71 That is why wisdom differs from faith, Albert says; for faith merely sees, whereas wisdom tastes and experiences the things of God {gustantur divina per experimentum)J 2 Thus we see that medieval writers preceding St. Thomas used the term "experimental knowledge" to designate the kind of knowledge which is coupled with an affective experience of love and spiritual taste. Experiential knowledge was conceived of as knowledge that is joined to charity and to the affective experiences that go with charity. Moreover, as some of them pointed out, these affective experiences can form the basis for a conjectural knowledge of the possession of charity: the just man can reason from these experiences (as well as from other signs) to the probable presence of charity in his soul.
Furthermore, not one of these writers gives us the slighest cause for believing that he is thinking of experimental knowledge as involving an intellectual experience of God. There is no evidence at all that they understood experimental knowledge to be experimental qua knowledge. What is more, we have found nothing up to this point to suggest that our knowledge of the divine Persons sent to us in an invisible mission, or our knowledge of God through wisdom, is anything more than ordinary knowledge which is accompanied by the love and taste brought by charity. 
St. Thomas Aquinas
Ad tertium dicendum, quod non qualiscumque cognitio sufficit ad rationem missionis, sed solum ilia quae accipitur ex aliquo dono appropriato personae, per quod efficitur in nobis conjunctio ad Deum, secundum modum proprium illius personae, scilicet per amorem, quando Spiritus sanctus datur. Unde cognitio ista est quasi experimentalis.
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Now it is easy to see that there is no close verbal resemblance among these four responses. But it is also easy to see that the first two contain substantially the same solution: the knowledge that comes from inform faith is insufficient; for when St. Augustine wrote mitti est cognosci, he was thinking, not of sheer knowledge, but of knowledge that is coupled with supernatural love. St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, takes a different and somewhat simpler approach; for whereas Peter of Poitiers and the redactor of the Summa fratris Alexandri responded by specifying the knowledge as knowledge that is joined to charity {cognitio devotionis and cognitio conjuncta affectioni amoris), St. Bonaventure solves the difficulty by specifying the object of the St. Albert explained that when St. Augustine wrote "mitti est cognosci quod ab alio sit," he meant that the Person sent is known by an effect which (1) is appropriable to the Person, and (2) is an effect of gratia gratum faciens, which always entails the presence of that Person. St. Thomas put the same requirements: the knowledge necessary for the mission is had from a gift of God which (1) is appropriable to a particular Person, and (2) is a link joining the soul to God according to the proper mode of the Person and so entails His presence; thus, for instance, (1) from a knowledge of his charity which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit a man knows the Holy Spirit, and (2) through this charity he is joined to God, or rather, by appropriation, to the Person of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, St. Thomas observes, this knowledge is quasi-experimental: Unde cognitio ista est quasi experimentalis. Wherefore is it quasi-experimental? Surely St. Thomas does not draw this conclusion from the first fact-that it is taken from a gift which is appropriated to the divine Person-but rather from the second-that it is a gift which joins the soul to God, or more precisely, as St. Albert puts it, that it is a gift which is gratum faciens. In other There are two other places in the Scriptum where St. Thomas describes the knowledge involved in the mission as experimental; but these passages need not delay us, since from them alone nothing decisive can be concluded. 85 There is, however, an important passage in the Prima pars of the Summa theologian (1266-68).
In an article concerning the invisible mission of the Son of God, St. Thomas repeats an objection which he already had considered in his Scriptum: the invisible mission of a divine Person takes place only according to gifts which are gratum facientia; the gifts of the intellect, however, according to which the Son proceeds, are not gratum facientia; therefore, the Son is not sent on an invisible mission.
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The answer, of course, is that the Son proceeds as the Word spirating Love; therefore, the Son is sent according to a gift of the intellect which bursts into love. Accordingly, in both responses St. Thomas explains that the just man's knowledge of the Son sent to inhabit his soul is knowledge which bursts into or is followed by supernatural love {prorumpat in affectum amoris, sequitur amor gratuitus). But to the response in the Summa St. Thomas adds the observation that he made before in a similar context in the Scriptum: this knowledge, he says, is followed by love, and therefore (Et ideo) St. Augustine expressly pointed out that the Son is sent when He is both known and perceived, for "perception" shows that the knowledge is experimental. In other words, what Thomas says is this: the knowledge of the Son is followed by the love of charity, and for this reason it is called experimental knowledge; for St. Augustine indicated this when he said that the Son is sent, not simply when He is known, but when He is known and perceived; for the word "perception" designates an act of the qffectus.* 9 Furthermore, St. Thomas also points out in this passage that experimental knowledge is properly called wisdom, since it joins knowledge to a kind of taste. This remark is quite in line with his understanding of wisdom; for, according to Thomas, proper to wisdom is not merely speculative but affective knowledge, that is, knowledge which leads to love:
Duplex est cognitio ventatisi una quidem quae habetur per gratiam; alia vero quae habetur per naturam. Et ista quae habetur per gratiam est duplex: una quae est speculativa tantum, sicut cum alicui aliqua secreta divinorum revelantur; alia vero quae est affectiva, producens amorem Dei; et haec proprie pertinet ad donum Sapientiae. 90 Accordingly, from this passage and from the passage quoted above one might well reason: the experimental knowledge of the mission is the proper knowledge of wisdom; 91 but the proper knowledge of wisdom is affective knowledge; 92 therefore, experimental knowledge is affective knowledge, that is, knowledge which leads to love (producens amorem Dei). As a matter of fact, St. Thomas himself in another place expressly identifies these two terms, "affective" and "experimental," as synonymous.
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In the Secunda secundae St. Thomas explains that wisdom is essentially an intellectual gift whose act is right judgment, but that it has its cause, which is charity, in the will. For this gift enables the just man to judge God and creatures for what they truly are from God's standpoint. This right estimation is derived from a certain connaturality or union with the things of God which is effected by charity; 94 for charity conveys taste (sapor), consisting in an affective experience of spiritual delectations. This is brought out sharply in St. Thomas' response to the following objection: "Praeterea, Eccli. 6 dicitur: Sapientia doctrinae secundum nomen eins est. Dicitur autem sapientia quasi sapida scientia: quod videtur ad affectum pertinere, ad quern pertinet experiri spirituales delectationes seu dulcedines. Ergo sapientia non est in intellectu, sed magis in affectu." 96 This conclusion is rejected by St. Thomas for the following reason: "... loquitur de sapientia quantum ad suam causam. Ex qua etiam sumitur nomen sapientiae, secundum quod saporem quendam importat.
,,9e
Its cause, of course, is charity. 97 Hence, it is charity that joins taste to the knowledge of wisdom, adding to knowledge an affective experience of spiritual sweetness and delectation.
Therefore, the just man judges from a connaturality or union with the things of God which is effected by charity and spiritual taste; from this taste he is enabled to form a right estimation of God and creatures. Like Hierotheus, he learns divine things by experiencing them. Now, it is interesting to note that in his De ventate St. Thomas explicitly stated that Hierotheus' experience of divine things was an affective act: "... passio illa de qua loquitur Dionysius, nihil aliud est quam affectio ad divina, quae habet magis rationem passionis quam simplex apprehensio... ." 98 Hence it is that the just man's knowledge of the goodness of God is said to be affective or experimental knowledge, because it is joined to an affective experience of love and spiritual taste.
Experimental Knowledge of Charity
In his commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas teaches that no one can tell for sure that he has charity except through divine revelation; but one can conjecture to it from probable signs. The best of these signs is the absence of remorse, but even this is not a certain "Ibid., q. 45, a. 2, obj. 2. * Ibid., q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m. This same objection was answered in the Scriptum by St. Thomas in the same way: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod saporem sapientia importât quantum ad dilectionem praecedentem, non quantum ad cognitionem sequentem, nisi ratione delectationis quae ipsam cognitionem in actu exequitur" (In 3 dulcedinis) which are probable signs from which he can conjecture to the presence of grace and of God in his soul. Moreover, it is important to note that like William of Auxerre, Hugh of St. Cher, John of La Rochelle, and so many others, St. Thomas calls our knowledge of our charity experimental, not only when it is conjectured from such an affective experience, but also when it is inferred from any probable sign, that is to say, whenever it is obtained by means of an expertmentum, which is a test or proof. 104 Thus, in this same article, to the objection that Abraham knew that he had a holy fear and hence grace, St. Thomas replies that Abraham knew that he had grace either by a special revelation from God or else experimentally in his deed, that is, through the test he underwent to prove his love and fear of God. 1, q. 114, a. 2, c; ibid. 2-2, q. 10, a. 1, c; ibid., q. 97, a. 1, c similitudinem) , not in the proper sense in which it is used to refer to an act of sense cognition, nor in the sense in which it is commonly transferred to designate an act of the intellect. Accordingly, what historical evidence we have for the meaning of the qualifications which St. Thomas puts on our experimental knowledge of God points to the same conclusion we have already arrived at: our knowledge of the indwelling Persons is quasi-experimental, experimental in a certain way (quodammodo), i.e., inasmuch as it is joined to an affective experience of love and taste.
Transfertur enim experientiae nomen etiam ad intellectualem cognitionem, sicut etiam ipsa nomina sensuum, ut visus et auditus ...." Cf. also Sum. theoL 1, q. 54, a. 5, ad obj. It might also be noted here that in a technical sense, borrowed from Aristotle, txpmmmtum (empeiria) is taken by St. Thomas to designate the fruit of a comparison of many singulars stored up in the memory: it is peculiar to man, pertains to the cogitative power, and is called particular reason, whose function is to compare individual intentions, just as the intellect compares universal intentions (cf., for example, ExposUio in 1Z Metaph., lib. 1, lect. 1, alia quidem). Moreover, while experimental knowledge, in this Aristotelian sense, is discursive knowledge, it is said to be shared by angels and demons in an analogous manner, inasmuch as they know objects which are present and sensible but without any discursus: "Fraeterea, Isidoras dicit quod daemones per experientiam multa cognoscunt. Sed experimentalis cognitio est discursiva: ex multis enim memorüs fit unum experimentum, et ex multis experimentis fit unum universale, ut dicitur in fine Poster., et in principio Metaphys. Ergo cognitio angelorum est discursiva" (Sum. theol. 1, p. 58, a. 3, obj. 3) . "Ad tertium dicendum quod experientia in angelis et daemonibus dicitur secundum quandam similitudinem, prout scilicet cognoscunt sensibilia praesentia; tarnen absque omni discursu" (ibid., ad 3m). Finally, as we shall see immediately below in the text, quaedam experientia is taken by St. Thomas to signify an affective rather than cognoscitive experience, designating a complacentia of the appetite in its object. 1-2, q. 112, a. 5), saporem quendam (ibid. 2-2, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m) .
CONCLUSION
These pages began with the fact that the just man, according to St. Thomas, enjoys a quasi-experimental knowledge of the divine Persons sent to live with him in his soul. Now that we have studied this doctrine in its historical context, we can easily understand its meaning. For, as we have seen, immediately before and at the time St. Thomas was writing his theology it was commonly taught, especially at the University of Paris, that the knowledge necessary for the invisible mission must be more than inform faith: it must be accompanied by supernatural love and the spiritual taste and delectation that this love brings. What is more, such knowledge was commonly called affective or experimental knowledge by the Schoolmen of the time, because it is linked to the affective experience of love and spiritual delectation. Now it was in line with this tradition that St. Thomas insisted that the just man's knowledge of the divine Persons sent to inhabit his soul must needs be not merely inform faith but knowledge accompanied by charity, that is to say, experimental knowledge. Moreover, such knowledge belongs to wisdom, since the spiritual taste and connaturality resulting from the affective union with God through charity afford the just man a basis for a correct estimation of God and His creatures. Therefore, one thing above all appears to be clear: whatever is to be said philosophically or theologically about the theories of Gardeil and Garrigou-Lagrange, historically they are found gratuitous: as far as we have been able to discover, there is no historical evidence in the writings of St. Thomas, of his predecessors, or of his contemporaries to support the theories of immediate, supraintentional or mediate, supradiscursive cognition. These theories apparently are based on the modern meaning of the word "experimental." They can hardly be said to render the meaning of the term as it was used in the time of St. Thomas and by St. Thomas himself.
As for Galtier's interpretation of our experimental knowledge of the divine Persons, we may merely say that while it is certainly true that for St. Thomas, as for his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, the expression "experimental knowledge" was used to denote discursive cognition, the discursive aspect of experimental knowledge was not to the point when Thomas applied the term to our knowledge of the divine Persons sent to our souls on an invisible mission. It is true that "experimental knowledge" at that time was applied to discursive knowledge based on an experimenkm. But it was abo used to signify knowledge that is accompanied by an affective experience of love and taste. Now, as we have seen, it was for this latter reason and in this latter sense that the term was employed by St. Thomas when describing our knowledge of the divine Persons. That this affective experience might constitute or contribute to an experimentum from which the presence of the divine Persons in the soul could be conjectured or deduced was irrelevant to Thomas* purpose and thought when explaining the Augustinian adage mitii est cognosce He was not intent on describing our knowledge of God's presence or of our state of grace but our knowledge of the divine Person who "is sent when He is known." And what he tells us is that He is sent when He is known, not by inform faith, but by knowledge informed by charity. And it is for this reason and in this sense that he calls it experimental or affective knowledge, i.e., knowledge which is joined to the savorous and affective experience brought by divine charity.
But if the question be pressed, Is quasi experimenkdis cognitio discursive knowledge? we must reply, in all fairness, that the only legitimate presumption is that it is. For while this was not the point St. Thomas was making when he said that our knowledge of the divine Persons is quasi-experimental (the point was simply that it is knowledge which is joined to love), it is nevertheless a historical fact that experimenialis cognitio designated a knowledge which was discursive; and St. Thomas himself gives us no reason to suppose that he meant to exclude this discursive quality from the knowledge he described as experimental.
The modern exponents of the theories of supraintentional or supradiscursive cognition do advance various texts from St. Thomas' writings to support their views. But when confronted with these texts, the impartial reader must confess that these theories appear to be read into the texts rather than begotten by them. The impartial reader cannot help feeling that those modern writers who find the theories of supraintentional or supradiscursive knowledge in the texts of St. Thomas do so only because they are already so committed to these beautiful and ingenious explanations that they unconsciously read them into the texts and not because such theories are really to be found there.
Let us take a few examples. The champions of immediate, supraintentional knowledge assert that our quasi-experimental knowledge of the divine Persons is to be compared to the loving knowledge which a soul has of itself; 114 then, analyzing what St. Thomas has to say about this self-consciousness, they build up their case. We may meet this argument at its first premise: Why, one wonders, is our quad-experimental knowledge of the divine Persons to be compared to the loving knowledge which the soul has of itself? St. Thomas neither makes nor suggests such a comparison. Nor does he describe the soul's knowledge of itself as experimental. We must conclude that one who studies St. Thomas in this fashion is surely using a misleading method.
A favorite text of the proponents of both supraintentional and supradiscursive knowledge is taken from 2-2, q. 45, a. 2. Let us cite the whole passage:
Sapientia importât quondam rectitudinem iudicii secundum rationes divinas. Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter: uno modo, secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum. Sicut de his quae ad castitatem pertinent per rationis inquisitionem recte iudicat ille qui didicit scientiam moralem: sed per quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa recte iudicat de eis ille qui habet habitum castitatis. Sic igitur circa res divinas ex rationis inquisitione rectum iudicium habere pertinet ad sapientiam quae est virtus intellectualis: sed rectum iudicium habere de eis secundum quandam connaturalitatem ad ipsa pertinet ad sapientiam secundum quod donum est Spiritus sane ti: sicut Dionysius dicit, in 2 cap. de Div. Nom. f quod Hierotheus est perfectus in divinis non solum discens, sed et pattens divina. Huiusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo: secundum illud I ad Cor. 6: Qui adhaeret Deo unus Spiritus est. Sic igitur sapientia quae est donum causam quidem habet in volún-tate, scilicet caritatem: sed essentiam habet in intellectu, cuius actus est recte iudicare, ut süpra habitum est. Now, to see in this passage a description of sapiential knowledge which is direct, immediate, supraintentional perception of the divine Persons seems to the impartial reader of the text a bit farfetched. 118 Of course, one who is precommitted to the theory of Garrigou-Lagrange may interpret this passage from St. Thomas in accordance with his theory. But one who is impartial and objective will not be so readily persuaded; he will admit that while such an interpretation is possible, it is scarcely required by the text. He will, in a word, ask for more convincing proof.
More convincing proof, however, is not forthcoming. In general, the argument of these modern authors takes the following form. They cite one or more of the passages in which St. Thomas describes our knowledge of the divine Persons as quasi-experimental; then they gratuitously assert their own interpretation, relying, we must assume, on the modern meaning of the word "experimental."
119 First of all, as ™ L'Amour de Dieu 1, 183-84. 118 Even John of St. Thomas points out that the gift of wisdom can be discursive because of our imperfection in the present life (cf. Cursus théologiens t nos. 655-57). The reasons John gives for this assertion are two : the gifts do not destroy but fulfil and perfect the mode of operation connatural to man as a rational being; secondly, we do not generally experience in ourselves any such light which enables us to know truths about any discourse of reason (ibid., no. 760) 
